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To maintain competitive advantage, a firm's
investment decisions related to knowledge crea-
tion are likely to be strategic in nature. However,
strategic investments usually have an element of
risk linked to uncertain and deferred investment
benefits. To date, such investment decisions re-
lating to knowledge workers have not been exten-
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sively researched. In this paper, we explore the
following research question: How do we strategi-
cally assess knowledge creation over time giving
consideration to complex decision criteria in order
to improve organizational value? We develop a
model based on economic and organization theory
for assessing organizational value with regard to
knowledge creation investments. Our model
prototype provides managers with a learning tool
relating to the timing and selection of knowledge
creation investments. Our own use of the tool in
simulation experiments yielded several insights
which suggest that the decisions typically made
by managers may dilute knowledge creation
investments. Our results demonstrate that the
organizational benefit of knowledge creation pro-
cesses should be well aligned with near-term
tasks. Under instances of high knowledge depre-
ciation, however, it is unlikely that individual
workers can optimize knowledge creation process
decisions without organizational involvement in
matching skills to task complexities. The organiza-
tional benefits of consistent and frequent knowl-
edge creation process participation increase over
time as the match of skills and task complexities
improve.
Keywords: Knowledge management, knowledge
creation, organizational dynamics, task charac-
teristics, organizational theory, economic theory,
simulation
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Introduction
Knowledge management has emerged as an
important research topic for information systems
and management researchers since the 1990s
(e.g.. Alavi and Leidner 2001; Davenport and
Grover 2001; Hahn and Subramani 2000; Nonaka
1991.1994). While knowledge creation is funda-
mental to the survival of a business, it has not
been extensively researched beyond organi-
zational theory. It would be easy (yet incorrect) to
surmise that many firms have developed sophis-
ticated, formal strategies within the context of
organizational knowledge creation. Many mana-
gers do appear to consider training and other
knowledge development programs during their
operational budgeting tasks. Ironically, these pro-
grams are often loosely constructed and quickly
cut during economic shortfalls. In this study, we
emphasize and investigate the importance of
active governance of strategic knowledge creation
for organizations seeking sustainable competitive
advantage.
Alavi and Leidner (2001) consider the firm's ability
to create knowledge and to take action upon it as
the basis for competitive advantage; however,
knowledge creation (KC) comes with a price. A
substantial KC challenge lies in the investment
tradeoff between future benefits and current
tasks,^ balancing essential near-term goals without
compromising long-term competitiveness. Oppor-
tunities for organizational synergy can also
influence how KC process^ investment decisions
are made. KC process decisions have an impact
on innovation and strategic management. In this
paper, we explore the following research question:
How do we strategically assess knowledge crea-
tion over time giving consideration to complex
Task: An assigned piece of work to be finished within
a specified time. Thus, task is a directed effort per-
formed by the worker with a measurable result that
benefits the organization.
^KC process; A unit of activity, either instructed or self-
administered, undertaken for the purpose of improving
upon individual or organizational tasks, with respect to
quality or efficiency. Thus, a KC process is an assigned
or unassigned activity with future tasks for which an in-
creased benefit is expected (Becker 1977; Mincer 1962).
decision criteria in order to improve organizational
value?
As markets continue to aggressively evolve and
while knowledge creation processes typically in-
volve some monetary and opportunity investment,
we find that the decision-making criteria needed by
managers to evaluate knowledge creation pro-
cesses for their knowledge workers are highly
complex and. therefore, should be carefully man-
aged. Our research contributes to the literature by
considering how cross-discipline theories interact
to influence managers' KC process investment
decisions. We develop an analytical model based
on these theoretical motivations by combining a
complex set of decision criteria for assessing the
value of strategic, organization-level knowledge
creation. This model allows for expansion and
refinement by understanding each organization's
specific situation including the characteristics of
the organization's knowledgeworkers,KC process
characteristics and investment options, the costs
associated with the work tasks, and the timing
considerations. Using simulation analysis, we
reveal results that are contrary to typical manage-
ment practice along with those that confirm typical
practice. Hypotheses are presented and tested
statistically with simulation results. Implications to
both researchers and practitioners are provided.
Our results demonstrate that the organizational
benefit of knowledge creation processes should be
well aligned with near-term tasks. Under instances
of high knowledge depreciation, however, it is
unlikely that knowledge creation process choices
made individually by workers would result in
maximizing corporate value without organizational
involvement in matching skills to task complexities.
The organizational benefits of consistent and fre-
quent knowledge creation process participation
increase over time as the match between skills
and task complexities improve.
Problem Elaboration
Within today's knowledge economy where knowl-
edge work exceeds the production of capital goods
as evidenced by the United States gross national
product, an organization competes through unique
280 MIS Quarterly Vol. 29 No. 2/June 2005
Chen & Edgington/Assessing Value in Knowledge Creation
capabilities and leadership to sustain some dif-
ferentiation from competing organizations. For
many knowledge v f̂orkers, external sources of new
knowledge creation must be regularly obtained or
the worker is at risk of obsolescence (i.e., knowl-
edge creation becomes an ongoing requirement).
It is seldom accurate to assume that knowledge
workers (unlike their production-oriented counter-
parts) become, and stay, proficient solely from
repetition and reinforcement of their past actions.
Knowledge worker tasks include (1) those tasks
similar to traditional production where on-the-job
performance includes task repetition and (2) those
tasks where scanning for new information or
knowledge inside or outside the organization leads
to knowledge creation. It is this second set, which
differentiates knowledge workers' tasks from those
of traditional production-oriented workers, upon
which we focus this study.
Knowledge worker tasks appear highly sensitive to
change and change is exacerbated by the Internet
and associated technology. As a result, ongoing
knowledge creation becomes an adaptation
defense. Consider the role of the enterprise-
software developer. Viewed traditionally, by con-
tinuing to program in the same programming
language, the worker reinforces and gains suffi-
cient skills to eventually be qualified as an expert
(i.e., repetitive reinforcement provides the basis for
expertise). However, this strategy has not worked
for COBOL developers, whose marketability (a
relatively unbiased value estimator of skills) has
not been enhanced by on-the-job reinforcement,
and may even have been compromised by it (Dice
Salary Survey 2004''). To be considered for new,
competitive initiatives, experienced developers
need to become proficient in an advanced
language, such as Java or C#, with proficiency at
the level of J2EE or .NET compliance for pro-
gramming. Continuous, externally obtained,^
Dice Salary Survey: http://marketing.dice.com/
rateresuIts/index.asp; accessed February 12, 2004.
^External KC occurs when resources beyond the repe-
titive activities are required to perpetuate or optimize the
continued level of achievement for the worker or for the
organization. External KC processes may range from
self-training (e.g., reading manuals and journals) to
structured training courses. Training is a typical, but
technological KC is not only anticipated, but
expected.
The process in which this knowledge creation
occurs may be informal, formal, or structured.
Informal KC lacks an organizational sponsor,
occurring through proximity or from specific
interest. Whether sitting in adjoining cubicles or
participating in informal communities of practice
(Wenger and Snyder 2001), individuals may learn
as much via informal channels as by other venues.
However, individual benefit does not automatically
result in organizational benefit unless specific
attention beyond that motivated by self-interest is
given to achieving organizational goals.
The organization has more control over formal or
structured KC processes, which are the focus of
our model. Formal KC processes have an organi-
zational sponsor and an intentional objective.
Formal KC processes, which often are manifested
in organized meetings (face-to-face or electronic),
can be distinguished from structured KC pro-
cesses. Structured KC processes, such as
training programs, subsume formal KC processes,
but also include a specified (and, generally, dedi-
cated) timeframe, an agenda, a sequence of
defined events, and a clear leader (facilitator or
instructor). Both formal and structured KC pro-
cesses, to be effective, should include both
repetition and feedback. Repetition is a require-
ment in learning theory (Piaget 1969), and feed-
back implies a presentation and interpretation of
results from the participants to the organizational
management. Thus, formal and structured KC
processes exhibit a systematic orientation.
The knowledge worker can assume the KC burden
and pursue learning solely from external sources
and observations, in which case the efficiency of
learning, the type of learning process (efficiency-
oriented or innovative), the timing of it (i.e., during
slack time at work or on one's own time), and the
organizational value of such learning are solely the
decision of the worker. Individuals may select
notexclusive, form of knowledge creation; other KC
activities include task teams, ad hoc committees, or
formal product innovation activities.
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Allocation considerations
- skill competence to task match (HI)
- KC process Intensity (H2)
- knowledge depreciation (H3)
- KC process selection {H4)







- percent time allocated to task
- KC process participation Organizational value outcome
Figure 1. Worker-Task Alignment
knowledge creation activities that maximize
personal utility but not organizational utility. For
instance, a knowledge worker finishing a task
ahead of schedule has three selection choices:
(1) participate in a KC process benefitting the
organization. (2) work on another task benefitting
the organization, or (3) choose an individual pro-
cess of purely personal utility, such as monitoring
one s stock portfolio or relieving stress by playing
an online game.
Alternatively, the organization can assume some
responsibility to align leaming in such a way that
knowledge creation for the organization is opti-
mally achieved with minimal impact taking into
account both current and long-term organizational
tasks. The individual generally determines selec-
tion and participation in informal KC processes,
and agency theory would suggest that individual
self-interest drives these decisions, resulting in at
least a modest if not substantial inefficiency to the
organization. As such, our model considers a
number of decision criteria pertinent to the
organizational value of formal and structured KC
processes.
The manager of an organization has the oppor-
tunity and responsibility to strategically align knowl-
edge workers' assignments to tasks or KC pro-
cesses (Figure 1), An organization has a specific
set of knowledge tasks that are required to meet
corporate goals competitively. A set of workers
exists, or will be hired, to execute these tasks.
Each task has a certain skill requirement which
characterizes the task in terms of complexity and
difflcuity. Resources, such as technology, which
are available to any worker performing the task,
are included in the complexity determination. The
required skill to complete a task is specific to the
task. The corresponding cost of performing a task
in a time period is also specific to the task, but is
influenced by the worker(s) assigned to the task.
Each worker possesses a competency level for
each specific task and can be assigned a percent-
age of time to devote to that task. A worker can be
given one or more tasks during a time period,
which is determined by the fit between the task's
skill requirement and the worker's competence for
the task(s). When the organization's tasks are
aligned with the workers' competencies, an effi-
cient allocation state exists. Organizational goals
are attained; the organization's competitiveness is
strengthened; and workers can be expected to be
satisfied with a task contribution that matches their
competencies.
New skills can be obtained by knowledge workers
by participating in knowledge creation processes.
However, these processes may have direct costs
and can be expected to have opportunity costs
when they remove a knowledge worker from per-
forming a desired task. The opportunities for im-
proved organizational value introduce allocation
decisions and considerations which the manager
can consider; these allocation decisions are
summarized in Figure 1 and correspond to
hypotheses which are more fully described in the
hypotheses development section of this paper.
282 MIS Quarteriy Voi. 29 No. 2/June 2005
Chen & Edgington/Assessing Value in Knowledge Creation
Literature Review and
Conceptuai Modei
From a business domain perspective, "one of tlie
major chailenges for management is to understand
tine role of knowiedge and iearning for organiza-
tionai ciiange and business success" (Pawiowsky
2001). We consider the value of knowledge
delivery to be essentiai within an organizational
context; therefore, we focus on ihe task as the
central activity of knowledge vt/orkers.
The manager's decision criteria, with regard to KC
process investments, are complex and not ade-
quateiy addressed by any one theory. Issues of
competitive outcome and market satisfaction of
organizationai goals must intertwine with the inter-
action beUween manager and individuai. in addition
to the potentiai ieverage afforded by organizationai
synergy. We find (see Table 1) severai theories
that influence each of these perspectives, which
we coaiesce into our developed modei. We start
vwith the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm,
incorporate various cognitive elements (learning
theory, cognitive decay, organizational memory,
and absorptive capacity), and acknowledge
various economic theories (compiementarity.
human capital theory, transaction cost theory, and
agency theory). These constructs are explained in
the foiiowing sections aiong with additional
research which has infiuenced their development
and integration into our model.
In our model, we maximize the sum of benefits (/7
of an organization over aii time periods
under consideration
^, = ^,- C,'" - C^""" " - Cl""'""^ - C'l^""""""
Furthermore, we incorporate the net present value
(NPV)as '* to capture the discounting
of these benefits over time. We define the
revenues (R) of an organization as the perfor-
mance on tasks based on v^̂ orkers' contributions.
Whiie workers participate in KC processes and
improve their competence, the organization bene-
fits from higher efficiency and output task perfor-
mance. Four types of costs are considered for
deriving the organization's vaiue. We classify the
compensation that a worker receives from an
organization into two different types: skill-oriented
(fixed compensation) and task-oriented (variable
compensation). Fixed compensation (C'" '̂*) is
based on the market vaiue of a worker's demon-
strated competence at the beginning of a time
period t, and variable compensation (c^̂ ™'''̂ ) for a
worker is based on the contribution of the worker
toward successfully completing task(s) during the
time period t. The cost of participating in KC pro-
cesses (C'™"'"9) is also considered. Finaliy. oppor-
tunity cost in a time period is the potential lost
benefit from that portion of time in a specific time
period where workers participate in KC processes
but could have contributed to performing tasks.
The scenario in which our modei appiies considers
a broadiy appiicabie management decision:
knowiedge worker assignment to requisite work
tasks and KC processes. At the beginning of a
time period (t). an organization has knowiedge
workers (/ = 1,..., I) and organizational tasks (/' = 1.
.... J). In a typical real-worid environment, an
organization has a finite set of knowiedge workers
and a set of required and desired tasks that often
exceed the capabilities of these workers in any
one time period. The organization can improve
upon the ability to respond to these tasks by
improving upon the skills of the workers through
knowledge creation processes.
During a time period, individuals may perform
tasks, such as developing a program and re-
sponding to project e-maii, and they may
participate in KC processes, such as iogging onto
an e-learning course for a new technology or
corporate initiative. Our general modei aliows a
worker / during a non-discrete time period to
perform more than one task. Our general model
also permits any worker / during a time period to
participate in more than one KC process. We
introduce a variable (X ,̂) to indicate the portion of
worker/s time devoted to performing task) during
time period t, and a variable (Y,^,) to indicate the
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Demonstrated competence of a
worker (e)
Actual or potential gain in
competence (G) due to KC
KC process intensity (v)
Depreciation rate for a specified




Underlying factor considering the
effects of eliminating duplicate
work tasks and aligning worker
competencies to tasks {M'^)
Direct costs: fees/tuition, travel
and living expense, required
materials (C'̂ «'"'"9)
Lost performance due to KC
participation (C°PP°^'""'»')
Theory and Supporting Research
Resource-based view ofthe firm (Barney
1991; Hitt etal, 1998; Ndlela and Toit
2001)
Human capital theory (Becker 1962)
Learning Theory (Anderson 1995; Schilling
et al, 2003)
Absorptive Capacity (Cohen and Leventhal
1990)
Cognitive decay (Schacter 2001)
Knowledge obsolescence (Flamhotltz and
Lacey 1981; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995;
Zell2001)
Organizational Memory (Alavi and Leidner
2001; Argote etal. 1990; Darr et al. 1995)
Transaction cost theory (Coase 1937; Simon
1951; Williamson 1980)
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976)
Complementarity (Barua 1996; Edgeworth
1881; Laursen and Foss 2003; Milgrom
and Roberts 1995; Prat 2002)
Human capital theory (Becker 1962; Josefek
and Kauffman 1999; Malcolmson et al.
2003)
Transaction cost theory (Baland and
Francois 2000; Coase 1937; Hubbard
1995 Stevens 1994; Vera-Munoz 1998)
Human capital theory (Booth et al, 2002;
Shaw 1992)
portion of worker /'s time devoted to participating in
a KC process for task) during time period t, where
K,i' y,,i^ [0, 1]; V / = 1 /and v y = i , ..., j .
During a time period, knowledge workers may
perform tasks, participate in KC processes in order
to increase their competence for future tasks, or
do both. Therefore, a worker's time consumed
during any time period t will be the sum of the time
in performing these tasks and the time toward
participating in KC processes, TherefSre,
Z y , \ ' Y — I^;.'^ JL. ̂ ,,, for any worker in any time
(=1 1=1
period.
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Competence and Increased
Knowledge
Both management theory and human capital
economics acknowledge the role of worker compe-
tence as a critical resource for organizations. The
resource-based view (RBV) (Barney 1991)
considers workers as valuable organizational
resources. Human capital theory (HOT) (Becker
1962) explains differences in income and
productivity in terms of ability (time to reach a
desired skill level) and opportunity (career entry
economic and social conditions). From the context
of RBV, managers consider knowledge workers as
competent organizational resources from which
competitive advantage can be obtained within a
particular market. RBV provides a foundational
motivation toward the continued development of
skills within the organization s human resource.
Competitive advantage is maintained and sus-
tained through a rare, inimitable, and valuable
resource mix. We consider that organizations
exist in a knowledge economy, characterized by
aggressive, evolutionary, and dynamic market
conditions. Sustained competitive advantage
depends heavily on human knowledge and the
ability to learn and adapt in unique ways. In a
study by Christianse and Venkatraman (2002),
RBV was found to be superior to transaction cost
economics with regard to the creation of human
competence.
Competence relates to the ability to complete a
task satisfactorily within a specified time period.
On any particular task, workers are likely to differ
in their competence, ranging from high compe-
tence to low competence even when other
resources are equally available. Increasing a
worker's knowledge of a task increases the com-
petence level. The continuous quest for new
knov r̂ledge feeds directly into achieving and
sustaining competitive advantage (Hitt et al, 1998;
Ndlela and Toit 2001).
In a strategic sense, increased knowledge can
relate to the introduction of a novel manifestation
resulting in an innovation. A positive relationship
has been found between innovation and knowl-
edge acquisition within an organizational context
(Child and Heavens 2001). It is interesting to note
that technology introduction does not dampen an
organization's innovative ability (Purvisetal. 2001)
presuming that workers are adequately trained
with regard to such technology. In an operational
sense, increased knowledge can result in im-
proved worker competence and task performance
quality, a production efficiency function.
For our model, at the beginning of each time
period, we assume that a firm has an objective
mechanism to measure each worker's demon-
strated competence (i.e., a firm does not consider
any actual or potential competence that the worker
may possess but has not yet demonstrated.). We
use E,̂  to represent the demonstrated competence
of worker/for performing task; at the beginning of
time period f and f^e [0. 1]; V /= 1, .... /and V ; =
1 J.
Intensity
An element of variability, which we call inter}sity,
occurs with respect to the KC process, to the
learning that occurs within the learner, and to the
task itself. These intensities are critical to ade-
quately derive an understanding of value within
any formal KC process.
The intensity with respect to a KC process relates
to the sophistication of the knowledge intended for
the participant. Academic courses are a useful
example of KC processes of differing intensity.
Courses at the 100-level (i.e., for freshmen) are
considered to be less intense than a 700-level (i.e..
for Ph.D. students) course. For practitioners,
training courses may be categorized as introduc-
tory (basic) or advanced. The amount of intended
knowledge during a KC process may characterize
intensity; i.e.. one will work harder during this KC
process than one would in a less intense KC
process, and the level of sophistication of the KC
process allows for a substantial increase in the
competence of the knowledge worker. Intensity of
a KC process may also relate to the amount of
detail covered. A low intensity KC process for a
knowledge worker may merely provide an over-
view of objectives, rationale, and procedural tips;
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however, the process can become more intense
by adding exercises and role playing to further
reinforce the objectives and procedures. The
intensity of the KC process with respect to knowl-
edge worker competence (relating to the topic
area) is considered when assigning workers to KC
processes; less intense KC processes are typicaliy
better suited for new or less-competent workers.
The second intensity type relates to the workers
absorptive capacity or learning rate. Workers
leave meetings, courses, and other KC processes
with different levels of new knowledge. Learning is
influenced by unique, individual mental models
{Anderson 1995) such that no two individuals
obtain the same knowledge from any KC process.
Groups working on different yet similar types of
problems over time (related variation) learn at
significantly faster rates than do teams working
under specialization (repetition, no variation) or
unrelated variation (Schilling et al. 2003) by
deepening cognitive structure or stimulating
insightful synthesis between different problem
domains.
A knowledge task possesses an intensity level.
Some tasks are more difficult than others no
matter who performs the task. Additionally, task
completion and quality will be affected by the
competence of the worker assigned to it. Worker
task assignments can improve in value for the firm
if productivity from completing a task is increased
(efficiency) or if the intensity of the task a worker
does perform is increased (i.e., replaced by a
higher value task). KC processes can increase the
worker s competence and as a consequence either
increase efficiency of performing the existing task
(providing slack for additional work) or qualify the
worker for a high-intensity task.
In summary, a specific KC process is directed
toward enhancing the knowledge and competence
of performing a specific task. We consider that KC
processes can differ with respect to intensity. We
assign a value between 0 and 1 for intensity of a
KC process for a specific task; i.e., v^e [0, 1]; Vy
= 1, ..., J (tasks). For our model, the increased
competence (G ,̂) for worker / by participating in a
KC process j during time period (will depend on
the intensity of the KC process {v), the portion of
time invested in the KC process (V;̂ ,), the existing
competence for task) (£'̂ ), and a noise term {p).
Therefore,
(1)
A strictly increasing S-curve function, /(•),
considers both learning and saturation effects of
the time devoted to a KC process. That is, the
learning effect will gradually increase and then
saturate at 100 percent as the amount of time
devoted (V;̂ ,) increases. Therefore,
where a> 1 andy9>0 (2)
When no time is devoted for learning, there will be
no competence gain for a worker; i.e., f(0) = 0.
Therefore, to ensure this condition, we modify the
formulation as
"' \-\-a a
where a > 1 and /? > 0 (2a)
0 ( ) is also an S-curve function. It is argued that
participants of a KC process will gain differently
depending on their existing competencies and the
nature of the KC process (basic or advanced). For
example, with a novice and expert user of data
mining software in the same introductory class, the
novice's skill level should increase significantly
while the expert user's skill level may be only
moderately improved, if at all. However, in an
advanced class, the expert's skill level should
improve while the novice could be expected to be
overwhelmed with only a minimal improvement, if
any at all. This reinforces the need for planning
with respect to KC process investments. We
introduce 0^() as an S-curve function with a
strictly decreasing trend. It is argued that by
participating in an introductory KC process, the
greater the current competence (i,̂ ,) of a worker,
the less the increase of the worker's competence
(a limited learning result). Therefore,
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where a' > 0 and (3' < 0 (3a)
We also introduce O^i) as an S-curve function
with a strictly increasing trend. It is argued that by
participating in an advanced KC process, the
greater the current competence that a worker has,
the greater the worker's competence increases
(with a better learning result). Therefore,
1
where a" > 1 and p" > 0 (3b)
Knowledge Depreciation
The concept of knowledge depreciation with
respect to competitive position is important when
considering an organization's strategic needs in
the context of aggressive and evolving markets.
Knowledge depreciation may occur either from
(1) knowledge decay or (2) knowledge obsoles-
cence. Empirical research supports the notion that
organizations experience knowledge depreciation.
"Knowledge acquired through learning by doing is
found to depreciate rapidly" and "failure to allow for
depreciation of learning may result in forecasts
with large errors" (Darr et al. 1995, pp. 1750-
1751), When a knowledge worker leaves a firm,
the organization's knowledge base changes, with
some depreciation inevitable either through decay
or obsolescence.
Knowledge decay with respect to human capital
has been established from both cognitive and
strategic management perspectives. Cognitive
knowledge is dependent on human memory, and
memory decays over time in numerous ways
(Schacter 2001). Knowledge decay can occur
from transience, absent-mindedness, blocking,
misattribution, suggestibility, bias, or persistence.
Organizations can also forget or lose track of
existing knowledge (Argote et al, 1990; Darr et al.
1995). Computer systems are considered to
experience knowledge decay from the attrition of
operational workers who are tasked with the main-
tenance of complex computer systems (Fielden
1990),
Knowledge may also lose value gradually as it
becomes commonplace or obsolete. As a source
of sustaining competitive advantage, knowledge
begins to lose value once it is codified (Nonaka
and Takeuchi 1995); that is, it begins to be shared,
transferred, sold, or stolen—diluting its novelty and
scarcity and, hence, its competitive value. For
example, once the competition copies unique
capabilities, the market value generally is signifi-
cantly diluted. Obsolescence of skills and knowl-
edge, turnover, and retirement can all act to
deplete the human resource of the organization
(Flamholtz and Lacey 1981). We believe that
obsolescence poses the greater risk to sustaining
competitive advantage as it is dependent upon the
complexity and externality of the market. Within
computational knowledge bases (Debenham
2000), knowledge obsolescence degrades knowl-
edge integrity by failing to update a knowledge
base as new, requisite knowledge appears.
For our model, a worker's competence will dete-
riorate from period to period with the depreciation
rate {S} where Se [0, 1], At the same time, a
worker's competence will be enhanced by parti-
cipating in KC processes (from G,j,), which acts as
a basic incentive for a worker to have an individual
gain on competence (human capital), (Other
incentives, e.g,, compensation for participation,
promotion, etc., can be considered in a more
sophisticated formulation.) While competence can-
not exceed 100 percent (i,e,, i-:,^,= 1 specified later
in constraint (17)), a demonstrated competence of
the worker / for performing task; at the beginning
of time period (can be formulated as (with a noise
term 0);
Employee Contracts
The employee contract is motivated by the need to
establish a hierarchical governance structure
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which differentiates the organization and creates
competitive advantage. Hierarchical governance
is an assumption of transaction cost economics
(Coase 1937) where specialized tasks are asso-
ciated with transactions and, by the nature of the
employment contract, associated with workers to
optimize the collective skill set to accomplish the
defined tasks (Williamson 1980). Without the need
for organizational differentiation, a market orienta-
tion would be preferred and the employee contract
would be replaced by a supply chain orientation,
pure market, or auction structure. Differentiation
of the organization infers that a group orientation
for achieving organizational knowledge creation is
preferred. Othenwise, individual workers gaining
new knowledge optimize their own task respon-
sibilities, and personal goals are not necessarily
consistent with the goal of the organization.
When the risk levels for desired benefits or results
are high or uncertain (as is often the case for
knowledge creation strategy), the employment
contract is superior to the market (or sales) con-
tract (Simon 1951). This conclusion shows consis-
tency with causal ambiguity as a requirement for
sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991).
Therefore, worker salaries can be considered as
an expense toward providing causally ambiguous
resource advantages for the firm, leading to sus-
tained market advantage. Knowledge creation
processes that are inherently strategic seek inno-
vation and, in such cases, the desired benefits or
results are not known with certainty.
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) con-
siders discrepancies in motivation between agents
(e.g., knowledge workers) and the firm {i.e.,
owners) with regard to goals and objectives.
Aligning worker task performance to those most
conducive to the objectives of the firm (i.e., firm
profit maximization) requires incentives, which are
designed to consider the individual interests of the
worker. Agency theory assists in explaining why
informal knowledge creation processes, such as
informal communities of practice, may be less
efficient for the firm than would formal KC pro-
cesses, as individuals will choose those processes
that maximize their own self-interest. It also sug-
gests that aligning worker motivation to firm
objectives with regard to KC processes may
require additional incentives, particularly with
respect to group performance and long-term
organizational goals.
We classify a worker's compensation received
from an organization into two different types: skill-
oriented (fixed compensation) and task-oriented
(variable compensation). Fixed compensation
iCf^") for a worker is based on a worker's
demonstrated competence levels for tasks with a
corresponding market value at the beginning of a
time period /, and variable compensation {C"̂ "̂ "'̂ )
for a worker is based on the contribution of the
worker toward performing task(s) during the time
period t. Therefore, in time period /, the






For our model, the value of performing task ) by
worker / during time period t is determined by the
base value for completing a task {C) and the
portion of time a worker / devotes to the task (X^):
(7)
The /WV) represents the unit market value of a
worker's competence for performing task / We
assume that My^ is fixed in the short run and can
be generally applied to each worker. C"̂ "̂ "'" is the
total compensation for the portion of time that




Synergy allows for a greater increase in benefit
from differentiation, or in a decrease in costs, than
would be expected from the mere summation of
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individual efforfs. Organizational synergy may be
viewed in terms of substitutable resources or coor-
dinated resources. Substitutable resources in a
study of the manufacturing industry (St. John and
Harrison 1999) showed no significant contribution
to superior cost savings or improved competitive
position; resource coordination did. In Barua etal.
(1996), resource coordination, attributed to com-
plementarity, was shown to be necessary for
successful reengineering projects.
Complementarity theory (Edgeworfh 1881) de-
scribes the economic value of leveraging a
resource into different domain applications. Teece
(1984) extends complementarity to consider how
a resource can have an effect on another
resource. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) demon-
strate that complementarity is supermodular (i.e.,
the benefits to the group exceed the sum of
individual resources). In applying complementarity
to human resources, Lauren and Foss (2003)
discuss two considerations relating to human
resources complementarity: (1) that it leads to a
reduction of effort by eliminating redundant tasks,
and (2) that complementarity is a source of path
dependence. Knowledge workers address com-
plex task sets, i.e., a set decomposing into various
discrete tasks which we could label A, B n. In
the first instance, human resources comple-
mentarity can occur when person A performs
knowledge task A which benefits one or more
other human resource, such as sharing a literature
scan among a group of researchers. The ability of
one worker to forego a task that has already been
accomplished by a coworker for another task set
allows the organization to acquire the revenue for
both task sets without penalty.
The second consideration acknowledges that this
interaction among resource groups introduces path
dependence among the resources. Wade and
Hulland (2004, p. 123) use complementarity theory
relating that firm resources "rarely act atone in
creating or sustaining competitive advantage," and
Harrison et al. (2001) showed positive strategic
management performance by applying com-
plementarity in the elimination of redundant tasks.
Thus, a manager needs to consider the availability
of worker competence as well as the timing of KC
processes in order for individual efforts to maxi-
mally benefit group outcomes and organizational
competitive advantage.
Complementarity squarely focuses the unit of
analysis at the group level. Complementarity pro-
vides more specificity guiding how human re-
source development should occur; it directs the
organization to optimize group performance
beyond the sum of individual performance. Com-
bining RBV and complementarity, the organization
considers the human resource as adaptable rather
than dispensable. The human resource can, indi-
vidually, improve upon its current state. Comple-
mentarity increases this value supermodularly (i.e.,
beyond the sum of the individual workers).
In our model, we define revenues (R) of an
organization as the performance on tasks based
on workers' contributions. Increasing worker com-
petence helps an organization to compete in the
business environment in various ways. On the
individual level, the benefit is measured by the
efficiency and output of completing those tasks
acceptably. We consider the required competence
to complete a task/ (L̂ ) and the actual competence
possessed by worker(s) for the task. If an organi-
zation's workers perform tasks but the workers'
competence cannot satisfy the required compe-
tence for the task, it is intuitive to assume that
these tasks will not be performed as desired.
Therefore, the true benefits from the performed
tasks should account for the discrepancy of the
workers' competence for failure and error. On the
other hand, if an organization's workers perform a
task and the workers' competence exceeds the
required competence for the task, the organization
will benefit from better efficiency and productivity.
On the organization level, supported by the theory
of complementarity, we use a markup level to
represent the additional benefit generated by
organization-wide competence as a competitive
advantage. Therefore, an organization's benefit
revenue should be formulated as
(8)
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M^ is the indicator for the benefit resulting from
the organization-wide competence level. For
instance, IBM can charge a premium for its ser-
vices because of its well established reputation
(supporfed by its highly trained workforce) that
would not be generally possible for a small com-
pany. It can be described as a function (g) such
as ''f )• We conjecture that the
marginal increase of the indicator is relatively small
and increases slowly when the organization-wide
competence level is small. The marginal increase
of the indicator is relatively large and increases
quickly when the organization-wide competence
level is large. Also, the indicator increases when
the organization-wide competence level increases.
Therefore, g() is in the form of a strictly increasing
exponential function.
(9)
Constants, ^ > 0 and 0>0. are assigned, and e is
the base of the natural logarithm. Managers can
alter the value of constants {A, ff) for a specific
functional form for g() in order to investigate how
organizational-wide competence levels affect an
organization's strategy. For example, adjusting
constant X affects the magnitude of the indicator
and adjusting constant 8 affects the slope of
marginal increase of the indicator. Therefore, if a
manager believes that the magnitude of impact of
the organization-wide competence to organiza-
tional benefit is relatively small, the manager can
set constant A lower. If a manager believes that
the impact of the organizational benefit from a
larger organization-wide competence should be
much larger than that from small organization-wide




Specific KC process costs are those typically
considered for KC processes, which include direct
costs, such as training fees or tuition, travel and
living expenses, and any required materials that
must be purchased to participate in the KC
process. These costs are direct and measurable.
Human capital theory (HCT) addresses conditions
under which employer and worker share various
training cost allocations depending on a variety of
factors (Becker 1962). HCT has been demon-
strated to empirically relate to information tech-
nology professionals (Josefek and Kauffman
1999), Training can be considered general (the
benefits apply equally to a market set of
employers) or specific (the benefits contribute pre-
dominantly to a specific organization). The
inducement for the worker to cover any of the cost
of general training is tied to the security provisions
in the employment contract and dilution of these
provisions reduces incentives for employees to
bearthese costs. Workers will reject requirements
that they pay for general training costs if employ-
ment contracts are not specific (Malcomson et al.
2003). For example, Java programming language
skills have a general market value (and under
HCT, workers bear the training costs), but a
worker will resist paying for Java training if a
Microsoft career is preferred and current employ-
ment is not ensured. So. while general training
provides a general benefit to the worker, em-
ployers are obligated, at least, to provide a benefit
on the training (e.g.. increased wages) in order to
retain workers, or to ensure that KC processes
maximally benefit the organization.
Under HCT, a firm should terminate a loyal worker
when future productivity is uncertain and hiring
costs are low; however, under HCT, market condi-
tions (and affected tasks) are static, not dynamic,
such as has occurred in the recent e-commerce/
e-business market. HCT also ignores the effects
of complementarity on organizational productivity
where workers affect, and are affected by, the
organizational context and group dynamics.
Therefore, careful assessment must be made by
the firm's management with regard to expectations
and policies regarding worker retention and
development.
In our model, the cost of participating in KC
processes {C^^'"0) \s considered. We assume that
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the cost of a KC process is linear to the intensity of
the KC process (i'). Workers may participate in a
KC process at a fractional levei, denoted by V̂ ,.
Therefore, with the base cost of a KC process,
denoted as Ĉ *̂ , the cost of participating in KC
processes can be represented as:
ctraining (10)
Opportunity Costs
Opportunity costs must be considered for organi-
zational KC valuation as the investment in a
specific KC process precludes that investment
from being applied to another KC process or task.
Transaction cost economics (Coase 1937) relates
to asset specificity in this regard and the degree to
which the asset (worker) can be redeployed for
other purposes without a loss of vaiue; opportunity
cost becomes the reduction in vaiue that wiil occur
from such redeployment. Decision makers with
greater knowledge may discount risk associated
with near-term opportunity costs more often than
will those with less knovi/ledge (Vera-Munoz 1998),
and opportunity costs may be valued more when
posed in a personal context than in a business
context.
A trade-off between short-term, rent-seeking
opportunity and entrepreneurial opportunity has
also been noted, where the organization's need to
maximize short-term benefits must be balanced
with the long-term investments necessary to obtain
future market leadership (Baland and Francois
2000). Interest rates and recruitment costs have
been considered as opportunity costs for not
training (Stevens 1994). Failure and errors have
been highlighted as the largest opportunity costs
for not training (Hubbard 1995).
Taken in the context of organizational KC and
human capital theory, workers would be expected
to use personal time (and possibly expense) to
obtain general training. Certain leisure activities,
though, may have utility beyond a person's wage
(Shaw 1992). If we consider that many knowledge
worker tasks are intense and draining, if not overly
stressful, workers may easily choose a seasonal
(time-sensitive) leisure activity such as fishing or
spending time with their children, over additional
regular wages for additional work. Therefore,
traditional assumptions of individual utility that
equate the cost of leisure time to no more than an
individual's established wage rate would not hold.
A negative relationship for termination costs has
been discovered in relation to a firm's willingness
to provide on-the-job training. Booth et al. (2002)
identified that employees were less willing to
terminate their employment with those firms
providing training than firms requiring employees
to obtain training using their own resources. Thus,
opportunity oosts should be assessed along
multiple dimensions. First, immediate opportunity
costs should frame the basic input into our model.
However, there are enterprise and longitudinal
aspects to consider when assessing opportunity
oosts. If the enterprise, in general, supports a
level of KC not supported within a specific depart-
ment (organization), that organization cannot
ignore the consequences of reducing what may be
perceived as an expected investment. Second,
the history of organizational decisions must be
considered when calculating opportunity costs.
When organizations have established KC process
norms, workers may be expected to resent
reductions in these investments; however, workers
are more likely to forego KC process opportunities
in the short-term when presented with a
compelling justification.
Conservatively, in our model the opportunity cost
Q̂opportumryj fQp gj^ organization in a time period is
the potential lost benefit from the portion of time in
the specific time period where workers participate
in KC processes but could have contributed to
performing tasks. Other opportunity costs, such
as errors incurred by a worker not having the
requisite competence for the assigned task, are
taken into account in calculating the benefit, R.
We, therefore, use the following equation to
represent opportunity costs:
Copporlimil}' (11)
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intensity of the KC process for task )
demonstrated competence of the worker / for task _/ at the beginning of time period i
increased competence for worker / by taking KC process for tasky during time period t
highest possible gain of knowledge from participating in any KC process
depreciation rate of a worker's competence from period to period
revenues of an organization as the performance on tasks based on workers'
contributions
base value for completing a task
cost of performing task; by worker / during time period i
level of competence needed to complete the tasky
unit market value of worker's competence for task;
fraction of worker/'s time devoted to pert'orming task; during time period t
fraction of worker/'s time devoted to KC process for tasky during time period f
base cost for a KC process
indicator for benefit resulting from complementary organization-wide competence level




specific notations relating to our model are
summarized in Table 2.
Formally developed from previous discussion, the








x̂ ,, v;, > 0
0 < G,., < 1
By inserting other formulas, equation (12) can be
expressed as
K =





Now, we can set up the optimization model for an
organization (with the decision variables X ,̂ and









In order to consider more realistic future benefits
of KC processes, we can calculate the net present
value (NPV) of benefits for an organization in
different time periods. Therefore, equation (13)
can be modified as:
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Maximize n = (19)
NPV{x) - where r is the interest rate of
the time period (20)
Hypotheses Development ^^M
The simulation approach is often used in social
science to address complex problems that cannot
be solved by other means such as optimization
modeling, survey, or case study. As defined by
Bratleyetal. (1987), simulation drives the model of
a system with suitable inputs and observes the
corresponding outputs. Further, simulation affords
the opportunity to explore multiple situations
ascertaining answers to research questions
without negatively impacting the organization or
individuals.
Our optimization model for assessing value in
organizational knowiedge creation is not directly
solvable or tractable without human interaction. In
our simulation, we manipulate external variables
such as knowledge depreciation and time (which
cannot be controlled in a natural setting) and
observe how these variables affect organizational
benefits while interacting with other variables that
can be influenced by managers, such as skill to
task alignment and KC process intensity. Our
hypotheses development reflects behavior or
expectations considered by many managers to be
typical management practice.
Skill to Task Match
We consider three types of skill to task match:
high, low, and random. A high match indicates a
strong degree of alignment between the desired
assigned task and the required worker skill levei;
a low match indicates a weak alignment. (A high
match for all knowledge workers can produce an
optimal contribution for an organization under
specific circumstances, but there is little evidence
to conclude that such optimization is typical in
organizations.) A random match assumes a uni-
form distribution of workers' skills to assigned
tasks ranging from high match to low match, and
is indicative of the effects of indeterminate decision
making. A high match implies that the KC process
participation decision considers the organizational
task requirements and complementarity benefits
for the intended tasks. A weak match is indicative
of a weak or naive organizational KC process
strategy. We can consider that a weak match (or,
at best, a random match) exists when knowledge
workers are expected to determine their own KC
process participation and investment which may
not result in organization benefits.
Should individual knowledge workers be the sole
source of the KC process participation decision?
Under human capital theory, individuals will maxi-
mize their personal marketability, but competitive
advantage in an organization necessitates skilis or
skill groupings (with others) that do not exist In the
general market. In practice, managers may leave
the selection of KC process(es) to the discretion of
the worker. Our hypothesis indicates this organi-
zational expectation.
Hypothesis 1: Organizations do not
maximize organizational returns when
knowledge workers determine their own
KC process(es).
KC Process Intensity
Can an organization reduce the number of KC
processes in which a knowledge worker partici-
pates to improve upon the organization's revenue
over time? The intensity with respect to KC pro-
cess relates to the sophistication of the knowiedge
intended for the participant. The manager's KC
process decision criteria goes beyond a simple
binary alternative of deciding if a particular knowl-
edge worker should participate in a specific KC
process during some time period. One option
relates to increasing the intensity of the KC
process in an attempt to decrease the number of
KC process participations. The rationale is that if
there is more information provided, then the
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worker can participate in fewer KC processes and
obtain the same net effect. If this is possible, then
the organization reduces the delay or reduction of
revenue that occurs when the worker is not
productive with regard to the assigned tasks.
Hypothesis 2: Increasing KC process
intensity reduces the frequency of
required KC process participation without
risk to organization returns.
them up to the group norm). The entitlement
strategy affects KC process frequency and
selection is commonly applied, but does it benefit
the organization?
Hypothesis 4: Organizations reduce
organizational returns by applying an
entitlement strategy with respect to KC
process participation.
Knowledge Depreciation
We equate low knowledge depredation to a stable
market or to positions similar to clerical or
assembly type workers as traditionally defined.
For these types of markets and positions, tasks
are well defined, repetitive, and slow to change.
We consider a market situation with respect to
what has been called "the new economy" as an
example of high depreciation. Managers and other
knowledge workers need to adapt to constant
change and strengthen their knowledge frequently.
How does the level of knowledge depreciation
affect KC process investment decisions? We
consider that high or medium knowledge depre-
ciation characterizes the environment of the con-
temporary knowledge worker. Knowledge depre-
ciation at a low level frames the industrial economy
or operational workers' tasks. Thus, requirements
for new knowledge may influence KC investment
decisions depending upon the level of knowledge
depreciation.
Hypothesis 3: Increases in knowledge
depreciation will increase the need for
KC process participation by knowledge
workers.
KC Process Seiection
In general, managers may consider KC processes,
such as training, in one of three ways: as an
entitlement (everyone deserves the same), as a
bonus (those excelling receive it as a reward), or
as a remedy (marginal workers receive it to bring
Longitudinai Effects ofKC Processes
Is it beneficial to invest in KC processes to the
detriment of completing some short-term tasks?
Typically, one may assume that KC process
participation, because it always incurs a minimum
of an opportunity cost, would negatively impact
short-term organizational benefits, but ideally it
bolsters longer-term benefits. The realities of
aggressive competition often pressure managers
into removing KC process opportunities to stay on
task schedule. This reality becomes self-rein-
forcing when schedules are determined without
ensuring adequate planning for KC process
participation. In our simulation, we consider short-
(12 month), medium- (24 month), and long-term
(60 month) time periods for assessing the impacts
of the various KC process decisions and
parameters.
Hypothesis 5: The pressure to meet
short-term delivery requirements reduces
long-term organizational value if KC
process investments are eliminated.
Analysis and Results
In the previous sections, we developed a model
reflecting the variables that affect the valuation of
an organization in light of the ability to improve
upon that value based upon the KC process
participation of its knowledge workers. Following
the development of this model, we hypothesized
several conditions affecting decisions that a
manager can make directly to impact organiza-
tionai value and of external factors that must be
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For a depreciation rate of 0.01, the competence of a
worker will decrease by 1 % after one time period.
No KC indicates workers do not participate in any KC
processes. Frequent (moderate) participation indi-
cates that each worker participates in a KC process
every other 6 (12} months.
For a worker participating in a KC process with
intensity of "100%" and base KC process cost of
"$500" full time in a time period, the cost is $500.
High match indicates that a vi/orker will be assigned to
the task in which the worker's competence level is the
highest.
The intensity of a KC process for task) in any time
period is between 0% and 100% in the simulation.
For a worker performing a task with required
competence of "100%" and base task cost of "$2,000"
full time in a time period, the cost is $2,000.
For a worker with competence of " 1 " and unit market
value of skill as "$200" in a time period, the cost is
$200.
considered that also impact organizational value
with regard to KC process participation. Speci-
fically, with many possible variations of knowledge
depreciation rate, task costs, skill oosts, KC
process frequency, KC process cost, task to skill
match, and KC process intensity in a dynamic
knowledge environment, we selected simulation as
our research method to investigate the relationship
and interaction of these conditions. Our approach
recognizes the contextual nature of knowledge and
allows for parameters to be modified as the
organizational context changes.
Simulation Setup
We followed certain assumptions and set values
for factors and parameters so that our simulation
would reflect a real-world setting. These factors
and the relevant values assigned to them for the
simulation are summarized in Table 3 based on
the following rationale. Monetary amounts (such
as $500, $1,000, and $2,000) are chosen as
reasonable real-world examples, especially with
respect to the high-technology industry. Specific
organizations may have different parameters;
however, we are interested in observing trends or
patterns influencing organizational value under
each scenario. This approach is structured to
assist theory-driven research. In addition, we
perform various sensitivity analyses on parameter
impacts.
We developed and implemented a simulation
program using Visual Basic. Pseudo code of the
simulation runs is provided in Table 4. We
simulated 100 runs for each of the 2,187
combinations to ensure comparability across
different scenarios of the selected variables: initial
worker competence on different tasks, required
competence for different tasks, and time periods
that workers are assigned to participate in KC pro-
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Table 4. Simulation Pseudo Code
Simulation Runs
Section C is looped for 12, 24, or 60 times for simulation of 1, 2, and 5 years
Section B through Section D are looped for 100 times and mean values of NPV are calculated
Section A through Section D are looped for 729 times for different combination of factors
(high/medium/low depreciation rate, high/random/low skill-task match, high/medium/low task
cost, high/medium/iow skill cost, high/medium/low KC process cost, high/medium/low KC
process intensity)
Section A
Set values for parameters and variables based on different scenarios
Section B
Set random number seed
Initialize settings of initial workers' competences on different tasks, required
competence for different tasks, and time periods that workers are assigned to
participate KC processes for the beginning of first time period
Section C
Assign proportion of time that workers devote for tasks and KC processes for
current time period
Assign number of tasks and number of KC processes (if any) that a worker will take
for current time period
Assign the task(s) and the KC process(es) (if any) that a worker will take for current
time period
Calculate task-based compensation for workers
Calculate skill-based compensation for workers
Calculate cost for workers' participation of KC processes (if any)
Calculate revenue generated from task performance
Calculate opportunity costs of workers' time for not performing tasks
Calculate profit generated from current time period
Derive workers' competences on different tasks at the end of current time period
(for the beginning of next time period) with consideration of knowledge
depredation and gain from KC processes (if any)
Section 0
Calculate net present value (NPV) of profits from ail time periods simulated
cess(es). For each scenario, we used the mean of
the net present values (NPV) from 100 runs to
avoid possible random effects. We also used
these mean values to perform statistical tests.
In the simulation, we reflected one time period as
one month and we ran 12.24, and 60 time periods
(representing 1, 2, and 5 years) for different
scenarios. We set 10 workers, 12 tasks, and 12
KC processes for the simulation. A worker's initial
demonstrated competence on a specific task was
assigned with 20 percent probability to be 0.8. with
60 percent probability to be 0.5, and with 20
percent probability to be 0.3 respectively (plus a
noise value 0). Tasks have a required compe-
tence level, (L), set at 1.5, 1.0, and 0.5 to reflect
task difficulty, allocated proportionately as 20
percent, 60 percent, and 20 percent, respectively.
Market values (MV,) of competences for tasks
were set to be linearly correlated with the required
competence level (L).
In the simulation, we operationalize the "high
match" scenario as worker assignment for an
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available task where the worker's competence
level to a specific task is the highest. A "low
match" scenario indicates that a worker wiil be
assigned to the task in which the worker's compe-
tence level of that specific task is the lowest. The
"random match" scenario denotes that a worker
will be randomly assigned to certain task regard-
less of the worker's competence level for that task.
Each worker can perform up to three tasks and
participate in up to three KC processes in a time
period.^ A worker's first time period for partici-
pating in a KC process is randomly decided but
each worker will participate in a KC process every
other 6 or 12 time periods. In addition, when a
worker's KC process time period occurs, this
worker has to allocate at least 50 percent of the
available time for the KC process in that time
period. The base task cost (C) and base skill cost
{MV) are set up so that the annual compensation
for a worker will be approximately $40,000,
$80,000, and $160,000 for low(C)-low(MV;,
medium(C)-medium(M\/^), and high{C)-high(MV,)
scenarios respectively. For each run in the simula-
tion, we calculated the net present value with the
interest rate of 0.005 for a time period (to reflect a
6 percent annual interest rate).
To obtain a corresponding range of values for the
indicators {MJ ) as (0, 6) with an exponential
resulting trend based on organization-wide com-
petence, we set A as 0.5 and 0 as 0.04 in our
simulation. We ran additional simulations for
sensitivity analysis of the effects on organizational
benefits from MJ . We found that the observed
results from these additional simulations identically
and statistically match the resulting trends
presented in the manuscript. That is. obtaining a
corresponding range of values for the indicator
(Mj) as (0, 3), (0. 6). or (0, 10) and setting
theory-based research has not yet generalized optimal
task or KC process limits for knowledge workers.
Therefore, we conducted sensitivity analysis by
restricting a worker to (1) up to tvi/o tasks and up to two
KC processes and (2) up to four tasks and up to four KC
processes in one time period. Resulting trends (similar
to those presented in Table 5 and Table 6) from these
two types of restriction remain the same as those with
the setting described above (up to three tasks and three
KC processes).
parameters A and (9as(A = 0.5, (9=0.03), (1 = 0.5,
0 = 0.04), or ( i = 0.5, 0 = 0.05), respectively,
derived the same major resulting trends for
measuring organizational benefits.
For the f{-) function of the learning effect from
devoted time, we set parameters a as 100 and p
as 10 to get a mapping of a (0, 1) range (per-
centage of time devoted to KC process) to a (0, 1)
range (learning effect) In a strictly increasing S-
curve functional form. For the Oo() function of the
learning effect from a basic KC process, we set
parameters a' as 0.01 and p' as -10 in order to get
a (0,1) range (i.e., existing worker competence on
the task) to a (1, 0) range (i.e,, learning effect)
mapping in a strictly decreasing S-curve functional
form. Finally, for the Oa(') function ofthe learning
effect from an advanced KC process, we set
parameters a" as 100 and p" as 10 in order to get
a (0, 1) range (i,e., existing-worker-competence-
on-the-task) to a (0,1) range (i.e,, learning-effect)
mapping in a strictly increasing S-curve functional
form.
Simulation Results
We simulated 100 runs for each of the 2,187
combinations of variables on two primary scen-
arios to investigate a manager's decision-making
alternatives with respect to KC process partici-
pation. Our results consider the derived organiza-
tional benefits in the form of net present value
(NPV) with the use of equation (19), In Scenario I.
we examined the effects (with respect to organi-
zational value) of the depreciation rate and the skill
on task alignment (i.e,, match) over time con-
trolling for KC process costs and KC intensity. In
Scenario II, we examined the effects of the
depreciation rate on KC intensity alignment with
respect to organizational value over time, con-
trolling for KC process costs, task costs, and skill
costs.
Scenario I
Table 5 summarizes the simulation results for
Scenario I. In this scenario, the impact on KC pro-
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e6p = KC process participation after every 6 time periods; e12p = KC process
time periods; NKC = No KC process participation. Note: All comparisons with
sample Mests for means yielding p values < 0.1.
participation after every 12
">" indicate that paired two
cess participation is influenced by skill to task
match (high, random, or low), assessment Interval
(12, 24, and 60 time periods which we equate to
months), and knowledge depreciation rate (high,
medium, or low). Control variables are KC pro-
cess costs and KC process intensity (both set to
medium). Note that we equate certain groups
(using "&") where paired two sample Mests for
means yield statistically insignificant results (i.e., p
> 0.1). In other words, these are the situations
where the two combined groups show no signi-
ficant difference from each other with respect to
the organizational benefits they provide.
First, we examine our model to identify observa-
tions that are reasonably consistent and relevant.
For instance, we find that organizational benefits
are better when task values (which become a
revenue source to the organization) are high and
skill costs are low (other than a few exceptions
discussed below). This observation holds true
independently of how often a worker participates in
a KC process (every 6 or 12 months, or not at all),
and it holds true longitudinally (over 12, 24. or 60
months). Additionally, we find that organizational
value is worse when task values are low but when
the applied skills require a high cost. Some
interesting exceptions occur when (1) knowledge
depreciation is high and there is no KC process
over the long term (60 periods) or (2) skill to task
match is low over intermediate and long-term (24
and 60) periods. For these exceptions, organi-
zation benefits are better when both task values
and skill costs are low and are worse when both
task values and skill costs are high. When
depreciation is high and there is no KC process
over the long term, workers' competence dete-
riorates dramatically and too many knowledge
workers must dedicate their efforts to a high value
task. Underthis circumstance, even when workers
are assigned to tasks with a high match, the
efficiency and output of performing these tasks will
be very low (i.e., the revenue source is low).
When the skill to task match is low over the
medium or long term, workers assigned to tasks
actually do not produce enough efficiency and
output in performing tasks to cover the high
variable cost c^"™"'". Therefore, for these
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exceptions, limiting the task value to lower the
variable cost C"™'"^ (with low skill compensation)
actually becomes desirable.
For Scenario I (refer to Table 5), when we
manipulate knowledge depreciation on the skill to
task match (alignment), under conditions of high
knowledge depreciation, frequent KC process
participation improves organizational returns in all
time frames (short, intermediate, and long term)
whenever a high skill to task match can be
achieved. In this case, the productivity from the
KC process offsets any revenue reduction due to
the productivity delay which occurs when the
workers are participating in the KC process(es).
These results change for other conditions. Under
high knowledge depreciation, but when the match
between skill and task is random or low. no KC
process participation is the preferred option in the
short and intermediate term (i,e,, 12 and 24 time
periods). In these situations, workers are unable
to compensate for the high rate of knowledge
depreciation and the organization will not benefit
with a low or random skill to task match. However,
infrequent KC process participation (i,e,, e12p)
does provide a benefit in the longer term, sug-
gesting that workers may eventually absorb the
benefits of some KC process participation for
longer-term organizational returns. Frequent KC
process participation (i.e., e6p) results in an
overinvestment under these parameters.
Under conditions of medium knowledge depre-
ciation, frequent KC process participation con-
tinues to provide better organizational returns in all
time frames (short, intermediate, and long term)
whenever a high skill to task match can be
achieved. For random match conditions, no KC
process participation is preferred for the short
term. Over time, infrequent KC process parti-
cipation becomes the most beneficial. Under low
match conditions, no KC process participation
becomes the optimal decision for all time frames.
Consistent with the high and low knowledge
depreciation alternatives, under conditions of low
knowledge depreciation, frequent KC process
participation once again becomes the best
decision over all time frames (short, intermediate.
and long term) to provide better organizational
returns when the goal is a high skill to task match.
For random or low skill to task alignment, no KC
process participation provides better short-term
organizational returns, but infrequent KC process
participation benefits the organization in the
intermediate to long term.
We can examine the longitudinal results (in net
present value) by referring to Figure 2. which
depicts the organizational return over the duration
of our three time frames (after 12, 24, and 60 time
periods). The figure shows the differences to
organizational returns depending upon the impact
of knowledge depreciation (high, intermediate, or
low) and with respect to a medium skill to task
cost. The charts on the left consider infrequent KC
process participation (every 12 periods); those on
the right consider frequent KC process
participation (every 6 periods). Actual value levels
(given the input parameters from Table 3) are
noted over time.
Under all conditions of knowledge depreciation,
organizational returns are better for high skill to
task alignment when KC process participation
occurs, with a relatively consistent positive slope.
Under high knowledge depreciation, both random
and weak matches exhibit negative slope (i.e.,
declining organizational value) over time. As
noted earlier in Table 5, neither KC process option
(frequent or infrequent) is desirable; more value
accrues to the organization when it has no KC
processes under high knowledge depreciation if
the organization cannot achieve a high skill to task
match. Under conditions of medium knowledge
depreciation, the slope for a random match im-
proves, but is relatively flat, while the slope for a
weak match continues to decline. Under condi-
tions of low knowledge depreciation, all slopes are
positive, although those for a random or weak
match are much less steep than are those for a
high match, and they begin to flatten over the long
term. Under these conditions, as long as skill to
task costs are moderate (or nominal), the organi-
zation will be profitable, but not necessarily com-
petitive (against competing organizations able to
attain a high skill to task match without increasing
their cost).
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Figure 3. Longitudinal Effects of Knowledge Depreciation Upon Organizational
Return
In assessing the entire set of charts, the level of
knovkfledge depreciation impacts the actual value
available to the organization; the higher the
depreciation, the lower the organizational value
regardless of v̂ rhether the organization implements
the best KC process strategy or not. With regard
to the frequency of KC process participation,
frequent KC participation results in higher value
which increases over time and for most high match
situations is independent of the level of knowledge
depredation.
Scenario II
decisions. Under all conditions, the preferred KC
process decision remains relatively constant, with
the exception of low knowledge depredation and
high match in the long term. In that exception
condition, any KC process participation is still
preferable to no KC participation, but the increased
KC process intensity appears to allow for infre-
quent KC process participation to become the pre-
ferred option. Under conditions of medium knovirl-
edge depreciation, high match, and a long-term
time period, no significant difference was observed
between frequent and infrequent KC process parti-
cipation when KC process intensity is increased.
Table 6 summarizes the simulation results for
Scenario II. Under different knovi/ledge depre-
ciation rates and time frames, we are examining
the ability to improve upon the organizational
returns by manipulating KC process intensity.
Our results show little to no substantive change
from Scenario I in KC process participation
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results in relation to
our developed hypotheses, summarized in
Table 7, which reflect the organization-level alloca-
tion decisions that need to be considered. Under
simulation, we consider a wide range of alterna-
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e6p = KC process participation after every 6 time periods; e12p = KC process
time periods; NKC = No KC process participation. Note: Ali comparisons with
sample Mests for means yielding p values < 0.1.
participation after every 12
">" indicate that paired two
tives to understand the many alternatives con-
ceivable relating to KC process decision-making
and its impact upon organizational returns. We
find that the decision-making process is highly
dependent upon aligning the skills of the knowl-
edge workers to the organization's tasks, both with
regard to competence alignment and with regard
to organizational synergy. Competence allows for
a reduction in workers per task due to increased
efficiency and synergy allows for a reduction in the
total number of discrete tasks due to comple-
mentarity that an organization must execute during
a specified time frame.
Skill to Task Match
We observe that with a high match between skills
and tasks (referring back to Tables 5 and 6)
frequent KC process participation provides the
best organizational profit. This observation holds
over the short term (12 months) and longitudinally
(24 and 60 months), and always holds true
independently of the impact from knowledge
depreciation (with the exception of a low match
which suggests in the long term, 60 months,
infrequent KC process participation is preferred
over frequent KC process participation).
No KC process becomes a preference for random
or low skill to task match in the short term
independent of knowledge depreciation level, but
as knowledge depreciation is reduced (to low or
medium levels) or a longer-term evaluation period
is invoked, infrequent KC process participation
becomes a better decision to increase organi-
zational benefit.
We find that these results help support hypoth-
esis 1. In our model, organizational value is
heavily affected by the interaction of knowledge
depreciation and time. The opportunity to highly
match knowledge workers' skills to assigned tasks
is critical to maximize organizational value, and it
allows for substantial differences in organizational
value when such a high match can be sustained
over time (see Figure 2). Additionally, in the
absence of being able to achieve a high match,
under conditions of high or medium knowledge
depreciation, no KC process participation may be
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1 Table 7. Hypotheses Summary
Hypothesis Description





2: increasing KC process
intensity reduces the fre-
quency of required KC
process participation with-
out risk to organization
returns.
3: Increases in knowledge
depreciation will increase






strategy with respect to KC
process participation.
5: The pressure to meet
short-term delivery require-
ments reduces long-term

























Individual knowledge workers can only
randomly match their skills (at best) with
organizational tasks unless they receive
organizational inputs {a KC process
itself). Agency theory supports that
isolated individual determination would
not result in high skill to task alignment.
Increasing KC process intensity shows
no substantial change in the decision
criteria of whether knowledge workers
participate in KC processes frequently,
infrequently, or not at all.
Increases in knowledge depreciation
decrease overall organizational returns.
Under conditions of high knowledge
depreciation, the organization may not
benefit from KC process participation if
it can only achieve a random or low
match.
Organizational returns are highest only
when the skill to task match is high.
Sending everyone to all the same KC
processes is beneficial only when the
tasks are the same.
Supported when knowledge worker skills
are well-aligned to organizational tasks
and for most conditions over time. Not
supported for short-term returns when
















the best option for maximizing organizational
value. It is unlikely that employees would self-
select this option or. if they do, may not do so for
the reasons assumed in our model. We allow for
two primary worker participation alternatives In our
model: task or KC process. Individual self interest
can include a third: idle activity such as non-work
related socialization or personal entertainment
(e.g.. personal web surfing).
So, by examining the results of our model and
applying agency theory, we can see that a number
of conditions will affect organizational value, for
which individual self interest may contribute nega-
tively or ignored. Therefore, it is highly unlikely
that knowledge workers alone will choose the cor-
rect KC process strategy to maximize organiza-
tional value. Alternatively, we do not suggest that
knowledge worker input should be ignored within
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the decision process. Our modei (refer to Table 5
and Figure 2) suggests that there is a dramatic
difference in organizational return between a high
match aiid the other options. Whiie we do not
investigate the factors leading to a high match in
this paper, it is unlikely that such a high match can
occur without a significant interaction between the
manager, who should represent the source of
understanding of future organizational needs in
addition to understanding the organizational value
of demonstrated knowledge worker capabilities,
and knowledge workers, who should also consider
undemonstrated and potential capabilities into
future task alignments.
Moving beyond our simulation, we can take a step
back and consider the goals of managers with
regard to their responsibilities to organizational
performance. One critical responsibility of man-
agers is to align the skills of human resources to
the required tasks of the organization; therefore, it
is not acceptable for managers to seek a low
match with regard to matching skills to tasks.
Additionally, only marginal or novice managers
would be permitted the goal of achieving a random
match; competent management should seek skill
to task alignment beyond that achieved by a
random match, continuously striving to attain a
high skill to task match.
Overtraining is implied when frequent KC process
participation (e6p in Tables 5 and 6) results in the
worst organizational values among those of the
three KC frequency options. However, this is
largely a risk for certain short-term situations or
with regard to some low skiil to task match situa-
tions. These situations are only likely to occur
when organizational tasks are unknown, when
worker competence is unknown, or when knowl-
edge workers select their own KC process inde-
pendently of organizational goals. This suggests
that frequent KC process participation resulting in
overtraining is unlikely over time for all but low
match conditions. There is a challenge to short-
term goals, however, where KC process parti-
cipation should result in near-term high match
alignment. If future tasks are intended to change
dramatically rather than evolutionarily, the man-
ager must plan carefully how such a transition will
need to occur. Presuming that high knowledge
depreciation and high task value represent an
innovative market opportunity, particularly one
such as bioinformatics, these results provide
motivation for organizations to strive to align skills
to tasks well.
The consideration of a sustained low match over
time may imply either management strategy or
management that is weak or naive. Under all
conditions, one might consider the wisdom of
remaining in a situation for which the organization
does not clearly know how to compete. If this
situation is true for a significant portion of a
company, corporate strategy may need to be
revisited. If it equates to one or a few depart-
ments, the situation may imply that the wrong
workers are being hired or retained.
KC Process Intensity
We do not find support for hypothesis 2. To
examine the effects of KC process intensity, we
invoked Scenario 11. In examining Table 6, we can
see that an increase in KC intensity, in general,
does not appear to substantially impact KC
process decisions when the goal is the maximiza-
tion of organizational value. In the event that KC
process costs to KC process intensity are random,
over the long term infrequent KC process partici-
pation appears to be preferred to frequent KC
process participation for situations for all but short-
term situations or under high knowledge depre-
ciation for the intermediate (24 time period)
interval. For a low skill to task match, it would be
expected that, under conditions of high or medium
knowledge depreciation, no KC process participa-
tion is merited. However, it is interesting to note
that under conditions of low knowledge depre-
ciation, in all but the short term, infrequent KC
process participation is preferred, but generally
even frequent KC process participation is preferred
over no KC process participation. We cannot
substantiate in this paper, but can speculate, that
perhaps this is an effect of riding a market wave
where anomalous, upward market trends benefit
an overwhelming majority of suppliers.
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An interesting observation is the lack of negative
effect on increasing intensity when achieving a
high skiii to task match. It vt/ouid seem that the risk
of overtraining with regard to the near and
intermediate resuits and a high match is very low.
In iight of the dramatic difference in organizational
value achieved by a high match (refer to Figure 2),
these resuits encourage managers to err on the
side of frequent KC processes.
Knowledge Depreciation
We find partiai support for hypothesis 3 and note
that the amount of knowledge depreciation
affecting an organization is a major consideration
in determining KC process strategy. The nature of
the KC process decision under conditions of high
knowledge depreciation is different from those
under low to medium levels (refer to Table 5).
With regard to high knowledge depreciation, the
decision becomes largely binary: to maximize
organizational profits, invest in KC processes
(frequently for a high match or infrequently for a
random match) or else consider no KC investment
in the short term (as a tactical decision). For lower
levels of knowledge depreciation, infrequent KC
process participation is the predominant choice,
with frequent KC process participation for ob-
taining a high match in the 12 and 24 time period
options, and no KC processes preferred for the
short term.
Under high knowledge depreciation conditions, it
should be noted that many managers hesitate to
engage knowledge workers in frequent KC process
participation, fearing that workers may leave,
wasting the investment for the organization, or that
budget considerations must take precedence
(Daniels 2003; Horner 2002; HR Focus 2004;
Jusko and McClenahen 2004; McClenahen 2004;
Poole 2004). Our results show that when man-
agers invest In frequent KC processes to achieve
a high match between the employees' skills and
the tasks they need to achieve, a positive return
can be expected even in the short term. It is only
when it is unknown (on how to match the em-
ployees' skills to organizational tasks resulting in
random or low matches) that KC process invest-
ments need to be considered carefully. In this
latter situation, short-term organizational benefits
are negatively impacted by any participation in KC
processes; however, infrequent KC process parti-
cipation benefits the organization, in general, even
in a random match situation overtime. Actual high
turnover would negatively influence our model due
to the possibility that the skills of new hires are
unknown, but previous research (Booth et al.
2002) has shown that training (a KC process) does
reduce worker turnover.
KC Process Selection
Support for hypothesis 4 is conditional upon
whether the organization's tasks are homo-
geneous or heterogeneous. In our model, the
amount and type of KC process is primarily
influenced by the gap between skills to anticipated
task, and other factors such as knowledge depre-
ciation and time. In one sense, these factors
indirectly support the consideration of KC process
as a bonus strategy: successful workers are likely
to be given more responsibility thus requiring more
knowledge and an understandable expectation for
greater KC process participation. However, even
this strategy overly simplifies the factors to
consider for maximizing organizational benefits
and group behavior.
In typical organizations, there are a variety of tasks
requiring a combination of complementary and
sometimes disparate skills. In general, the tasks
cannot be expected to be homogeneous; there-
fore, the KC processes to help knowledge workers
address their assigned tasks should not be ex-
pected to be homogeneous. So except for atypical
organizations, we find that our results support
hypothesis 4.
Longitudinai Effects ofKC Processes
In general, referring to Figure 2, we can see that a
high skill to task alignment (i.e., match) greatly
exceeds the value contribution to an organization
over random and low match over time. While the
range of organizational value in the short term is
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much smaller in the short term, the effects of
correctly aligning knowledge workers' skills to their
assigned tasks shows a dramatic increase over
time.
We observe (from Table 5) that frequent KC pro-
cess participation (every 6 months) provides the
best organizational value when skills are highly
matched to organizational tasks, supporting
hypothesis 5. For all conditions of knowledge
depreciation, if the match is low or random, the
organization achieves a short-term benefit by
providing no KC process but only by optimizing the
short term to the detriment of longer-term consi-
derations which also supports hypothesis 5,
Implications to Practice
Workgroup composition and task alignment are
significant contributors to causal ambiguity (Barney
1991), and optimal organizational value depends
on a number of dynamic factors that affect these
variables as is demonstrated by our model. Our
simulation exercises the model to identify trends
and valuation expectations within a specific organi-
zational context. Oursimulation results suggest to
practitioners that task definition and ongoing KC
process participation become more important as
knowledge depreciation increases. It also advises
practitioners to align the type of KC process to the
requirements of the anticipated task. Finally, it
reminds practitioners that reductions in KC pro-
cess participation are likely to have negative
longitudinal impacts on the organization.
Our model provides insights into complex decision
making with regard to KC process investments.
We demonstrate that task, worker competency,
and knowledge depreciation are all relevant
variables, in addition to measurable costs, in
determining the optimal choice for organizational
value. We suggest that managers should consider
the generalized observations of this study rather
than the specific values we employ. That is. it is
better to consider decision points like "frequent" or
"moderate" rather than specific values, such as 6
or 12 months, due to the context-specific nature of
the knowledge worker organization.
Implications to Research
Knowledge creation is fundamental to the survival
of businesses and yet it has not been extensively
researched beyond organizational and behavioral
theory. This study is significant to research as one
of the first to address knowledge creation with
perspectives from economics and information
systems, in addition to organizational theory.
The model we propose decomposes into a number
of complex variables, which are presented in a
parsimonious manner, and addresses the dynamic
nature of organizational knowledge creation and
depreciation. Our model is driven by existing
theory and extant research. The addition of a
simulation prototype aids our ability to apply
theoretical considerations rather than a mere
simulation based entirely on random number
generation. The latter instance implies data-driven
development, whereas our approach is structured
to assist theory-driven research that respects the
contextual nature of knowledge.
In a complex setting and where research is at a
new or embryonic stage, such as exists in
considering knowledge creation valuation for
knowledge workers, we consider simulation to be
a reasonable and appropriate research method.
Our model allows for the consideration of
interaction between variables in a complex setting.
Thus, it approximates the real world better than
would an experimental method where only a few
variables are considered. Additionally, it does not
require negative effects that would occur in a real
world setting to observe the same conditions. As
an artificially controlled model, many results may
occur as expected; however, the interesting results
are those that do not exactly conform to expecta-
tions. Our results can be useful in guiding sub-
sequent analysis, such as case study, survey,
experimental, and quasi-experimental research
addressing knowledge creation valuation.
Future research can address the nature of the
process to help qualify details relating to KC proc-
ess intensity. Our model assists in considering the
aspects of who should participate in KC processes
and how (i,e,, intensity) they should participate.
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Future research is needed to address the nature of
complementarity quantification. Our model does
not directly address complementarity, such as the
use of KC processes that change the nature of a
task {or by removing certain task requirements that
now may be performed by another in their task).
Further contributions to decision criteria with
regard to KC process and compiementarity wouid
benefit both researchers and practitioners.
Our model could be extended to consider different
valuation leveis of opportunity costs for each
knowledge worker. In a real world setting, an
organization may consider whether a certain KC
process has primarily organizational (specific) or
individual (general) value and such classification
influences to what extent the organization will
assume the costs. Similarly, even if it assumes
the costs, workers are not always excited about
participating in every applicable KC process.
Issues relating to current schedules and conflicts
relating to future task assignment can influence
opportunity cost structure.
Our current model supports knowledge work that
is aided by collaboration but not rigid specification.
For instance, one would demand that one doctor
who is fully qualified (e.g., 100 percent) perform
neurosurgery, rather than allow five doctors who
are all only 20 percent qualified to perform the
surgery. Our model could be extended to allow for
this type of rigid specification.
While our model supports almost all KC process
participation over a do-nothing strategy, further
research would be useful to consider the Issues of
task ambiguity with regard to excessive KC pro-
cess participation (e.g., overtraining). Our current
model assumes that anticipated tasks can be
defined rationally. In the presence of task ambi-
guity, further research could consider decision
criteria to minimize overtraining or, worse, under-
training scenarios. Future research could address
individual perspectives to consider whether over-
training is negative (such as increasing turnover)
or positive (such as increased innovation).
Conclusion
Our model provides a contribution, as one of the
first to quantify the decision criteria required by
managers and knowledge workers with regard to
knowledge creation process investment decisions
using organizational and economic theory. How-
ever, it becomes more interesting by providing
insights not readily observed in common manage-
ment practice with respect to these decisions, such
as the disparity in short-term decisions (i.e.,
frequent KC process participation preferred for
high match but no KC process participation for
both random and low matches), the extent of the
impact of high skill to task alignment over time as
seen in Figure 2, and the lack of negative effect of
increasing intensity for achieving high skill to task
alignment. It is not uncommon for managers to
leave KC process decisions predominantly to the
discretion of individual workers. Under instances
of high knowledge depreciation, however, it is
unlikely that individual workers can optimize
knowledge creation process decisions without
organizational involvement in matching skills to
task complexities. The organizational benefits of
consistent and frequent knowledge creation
process participation increase over time and as the
match of skills to tasks improves.
In this study, we focus on the analytical and/or
decision-making complexities for knowledge
workers whose roles consist of significant amounts
of knowledge work. The knowledge work is com-
posed of a set of tasks, each of which requires a
specific skill from a worker in order to accomplish
the task satisfactorily. Frequent KC process parti-
cipation, when it results in a high match of skills to
task, provides significant organizational benefits.
Training may be considered a useful example of
KC process participation, but knowledge creation
does not require participation in formalized
courses taught by external consultants. However,
we do not consider ad hoc meetings or poorly
managed gatherings to be considered adequate
KC processes. The intent of KC process parti-
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cipation is that it is a formal process (i.e., with
objectives, process, evaluation, and feedback)
whereby external information or knowledge is
exposed to knowledge workers in a systematic
manner.
We are hesitant to recommend homogeneous KC
participation. Sending everyone to the same KC
process may need to be reconsidered unless both
the Individual skill sets are homogeneous and the
task sets to be performed are homogenous.
However, empirical research could be useful to
examine the effect of homogeneous KC process
participation on complementarity.
The ability of managers to productively utilize
knowledge worker competency over time is a
critical element of strategic management. It is
important for managers to understand the relevant
constructs affecting KC process investment
decisions, the interaction effects of how these
various constructs affect organizational outcomes,
and how their own decisions can influence these
outcomes.
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